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CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees' Statement of the Case on pages 1 through 7 of 
their opposing brief is generally correct. However, it does 
contain certain highly inaccurate and misleading statements. On 
page two, bottom, page three top, thereof, the Appellees state 
that " . . . Johnson-Bowles offered to purchase . . . U.S.A. 
Medical stock from Utah citizens . . . ." This is fundamentally 
belied by the Appellees' own brief. In the last sentence of 16, 
page 12 of Appellees' Appendix "A" to their brief, the Appellees 
themselves held, on August 13, 1990, that Johnson-Bowles did not 
offer to purchase any stock from anyone after the Division's 
March 1, 1989, suspension Order went into effect. [Emphasis 
added.] This brazen inconsistency evidences that the Division's 
case, as it has itself articulated it, makes little, if any, 
sense. For instance, if the Division's administrative 
adjudicative proceedings are and have been predicated on 
Appellants' having violated Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g) --
because Johnson-Bowles allegedly "solicited" or "encouraged" or 
otherwise "aided" in the violation of §61-1-7 of the Act -- the 
Appellees by their own Findings of Fact in their August 13, 
Order, make it impossible to have violated §61-1-6(1)(g) on that 
basis. 
The Appellees further misstate the clear meaning and 
intendment of the applicable Department of Commerce rule in 
issue. On page 5 of the Appellees' brief, the Appellees contend 
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that Department of Commerce Rule R151-46B-12D contemplates that 
an "order" on agency review is to issue 20 days after the "last 
responsive pleading" is filed. This is neither the rule nor the 
law. The Division was required by law to issue an order on 
agency review 20 days after September 26, 1989, and there is no 
question that it abjectly failed to do so. The Appellees' entire 
opposing brief presupposes a complete misreading of the 
applicable Department of Commerce Rule and thus begs the question 
of how this Court should decide this case. 
Lastly, the Appellees assert that Appellants' 
registrations with the Division have now been suspended for one 
(1) year as a result of the August 13, 1990, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order thereon. (See Appendix "A" to 
Appellees' Brief.) This is also false in that Department of 
Commerce Executive Director David L. Buhler is presently 
reviewing the entire administrative proceedings and such review 
suspends the operation of the Appellees1 August 13, 1990, Order. 
In short, Appellants are not yet guilty of anything other than 
doing everything available to them to protect themselves and 
their livelihoods. 
REBUTTAL IF APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT I 
APPELLANTS DID NOT MISLEAD THE LOWER COURT IN THEIR 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE APPELLEES, 
IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY REVIEW OF THE ALJ'S AUGUST 29, 1989, 
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ORDER AND PREVENT ANY DISPOSITIVE RESOLUTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AT THAT STAGE, DELIBERATELY MISLEAD THE LOWER COURT EX PARTE. 
The Appellees contend that Appellants somehow 
"hookwinked" the lower court into granting extraordinary relief 
by failing to disclose in their October 27, 1989, Petition 
nothing more than the Division's own unilateral interpretation of 
Department of Commerce Rule R151-46B-12 -- a convenient "Division 
interpretation" that Appellants lacked the omniscience to be 
aware of in advance. On the contrary, a request for agency 
review had been sought by Appellants on September 11, and the 
Division's counsel, not the Division itself, filed a responsive 
pleading on September 26. The fact is that no order on agency 
review had issued from the Division nor had any other 
communication been received from the Division itself -- not its 
counsel -- as required under the applicable rule. Certainly the 
Division's counsel is not the alter ego of the Division. The 
procedural reality is that Appellees themselves mislead the lower 
court by informing the lower court that their counsel's own 
"responsive pleading" was tantamount to or otherwise excused the 
Division's legal obligation to issue an order on agency review. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE 
DIVISION'S FAILURES WERE ANYTHING BUT DISCRETIONARY. 
Throughout Appellees* opposing brief, Appellees 
presuppose that the Department of Commerce Rule in issue is 
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discretionary. Because the rule has a 20 day requirement and 
triggering mechanism for the issuance of an order on agency 
review, there is nothing discretionary about it. After 
soliciting this Court to follow their erroneous presuppositions, 
the Appellees attempt to distinguish Appellants' reliance on 
Aluminum Company of America v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746 
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(then Judge Scalia). However, the factual 
differences between Aluminum Company and this case has no bearing 
on Aluminum Company's legal holding. Specifically, Aluminum 
Company stands for the unambiguous proposition that a government 
agency must abide by its own rules and seeking an extraordinary 
writ in the district court to compel an agency to comply with the 
law is the appropriate remedy. Whether the order at issue is 
interlocutory or final is neither the issue in this case nor in 
Aluminum Company. The issue in Aluminum Company, as in this 
case, is that the government agency failed to comply with its own 
non-discretionary rules. 
Throughout the Appellees' memorandum, the Appellees 
further argue that the ALJ's August 29, 1989, order from which 
agency review was sought on September 11, 1989, was 
"interlocutory". Whether such order was interlocutory is one of 
opinion and it does not excuse the Division from failing to 
comply with law requiring affirmative conduct on its part. Such 
rule, by its own language, simply says and contemplates review of 
an "order" as does §12 of the UAPA. The decision the Court 
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should render in this case is that if an agency fails to comply 
with its own rules (i.e., the law), the relief sought by those 
like Appellants should be granted by default. This is because an 
agency should be penalized for stalling the just and efficient 
resolution of an administrative adjudicative proceeding, 
particularly when the respondent is hamstrung in the agency's 
self-serving forum and such person's livelihood and 
constitutional rights are at stake. Thus, because the Division 
failed to act, the request for agency review in issue should have 
been granted and/or the order should have been certified as 
"final" for immediate judicial review. Otherwise, persons like 
Appellants would be inextricated endlessly and unfairly in the 
administrative adjudicative arena as has unfortunately and 
unnecessarily occurred in this case. Belaboring the distinction 
of "final" versus "interlocutory" when discretion to issue an 
order on agency review is not the issue in this case is simply 
putting the cart before the horse. 
Appellees' argument that Appellants should have 
apparently sought extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeals 
further miscomprehends what is going on in this case. A general 
jurisdiction district court of the State of Utah certainly has 
the power and authority to compel a Utah administrative agency to 
obey the law. Wright v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 233-34 
(Utah 1980). There is no reason on earth why Appellants should 
have sought an extraordinary writ in the Court of Appeals and had 
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they done so, they would have had no legal basis therefor. 
Simply because the Division changed its mind and converted the 
proceedings from "formal" to "informal" -- ignoring its own 
sub-agency rules that such proceedings are always designated as 
informal1 -- does not lead to the conclusion that in this case, 
only the Court of Appeals would have had jurisdiction to make the 
Division abide by the law. 
The Appellees' failure to abide by the very rules 
governing them is certainly arbitrary and capricious. In Wright 
v. City of Wellsville, supra at 233-34, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that mandamus allows courts to intrude into or interfere 
with functions or policies of other departments of government if 
such body has acted capriciously and arbitrarily. Accord: 
Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement 
Commission, 764 P.2d 172, 180 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1988). Contrary to 
what Appellees assert, the case at bar does not involve policy, 
but rules -- rules which are not to be enforced capriciously and 
arbitrarily as Appellees have done. 
In All Purpose Vending, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 
561 A.2d 1309, 1311 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1989), a case cited by 
Appellees, the Court held that the existence of substantial 
1
 At the time the Division's petitions were filed in 
April 1989, the Division's administrative adjudicative 
proceedings under R177-6-lg, "Dishonest or Unethical Business 
Practices", were expressly designated as "informal". The 
Division amended its rules effective, July 1, 1990, at Blue Sky 
L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH) 157,403, pp. 50,508-511. 
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questions of constitutionality and the absence of adequate 
statutorily prescribed remedies, confers equity jurisdiction on a 
court. Accord: Ledbetter, supra at 180. In this case, there 
were no statutory remedies available to Appellants and the 
Constitutional questions raised by Appellants in the lower court 
with regard to federal pre-emption and the inherent conflict of 
Appellants' admini ~rative prosecutors, judges, and jurors are 
substantial enough that the lower court indeed had jurisdiction 
to address them. Unfortunately, the lower court did not and 
therefore, this appeal exists. 
The issue in this case is not Appellants' failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies as Appellees would want this 
court to believe. Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and 
Zoning Commission, 659 P.2d 1065, 1967 (Utah 1983). On the 
contrary, Appellants were pursuing all administrative remedies 
available to them. The problem is that such remedies weren't 
sufficient. This, coupled with Appellees' "do-nothing" judicial 
attitude prejudicing Appellants, forced Appellants to do what 
they did in an attempt to fully resolve the proceedings quickly 
and otherwise protect themselves and their livelihoods. 
In sum, the Division would have had to act 
properly -- or at least within its discretion -- for mandamus not 
to lie in the district court. Ingram-Clevenger, Inc. v. Lewis 
and Clark County, 636 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 
1981)(holding that if there has been an abuse of discretion 
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amounting to no exercise of discretion at all, mandamus will lie 
to compel proper exercise of powers granted); Olsen v. Salt Lake 
City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 39 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39, 42 
(Sup. Ct. 1986)(holding that where the law imposes limitations on 
the exercise of discretion, mandamus is available to enforce 
those limitations). In this case, it was improper for the 
Division to disregard and ignore its own rules only to prejudice 
Appellants. Under the circumstances, the Division had no 
discretion to keep Appellants from doing whatever they could to 
resolve the proceedings according to the very law governing the 
Division. Thus, the district court indeed had jurisdiction to 
expedite or resolve the proceedings. This is not to ignore that 
the district court itself abused its discretion in not 
reinstating the extraordinary writ, and therefore it can and 
should be reversed on appeal. Garcia v. City of South Tucson, 
663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. App. 1983). In fact, because there was 
no impossibility of performance on the part of the Division, the 
district court erred in not reinstating the extraordinary writ. 
Garcia, supra at 598. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT III 
WHETHER THE ALJ'S ORDER FROM WHICH AGENCY REVIEW WAS 
SOUGHT WAS "INTERLOCUTORY" OR "FINAL" IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS 
APPEAL AND THE MERITS HEREOF BECAUSE SUCH REVIEW HAS A 
"SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT UPON THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS"-
- 8 -
The Appellees have cited several cases in their brief, 
which, if examined, readily support Appellants' appeal on the 
merits. In In Re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 
85, 447 A.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that there is nothing improper about reviewing a so-called 
"interlocutory order" if it has "a substantial effect upon the 
ultimate outcome of the proceedings", ^d. at 158-159. In this 
case, if it could have been quickly established that the Division 
lacked jurisdiction to discipline Appellants simply for complying 
with their concomitant federal obligations, the case would have 
been disposed of summarily as opposed to Vh years of pointless 
litigation, substantial pain and suffering, and thousands and 
thousands of dollars later. Unfortunately, the Division wanted 
its pound of flesh and wasn't interested in learning that it may 
have lacked jurisdiction. In fact, the Appellees' conduct and 
arrogant attitude brings to mind the words of philosopher Herbert 
Spencer: 
There is a principle which is a bar against 
all information, which is proof against all 
arguments and which cannot fail to keep man in 
everlasting ignorance -- that principle is 
contempt prior to investigation.2 
Based on the foregoing, whether the ALJ's order was 
"interlocutory" or not is irrelevant to the disposition of this 
case, an argument comprising virtually all of Appellees' brief. 
2
 Source: The "Big Book" of Alcoholics Anonymous, 
Alcoholics Anonymous World Wide Services, Inc., Third Edition, 
New York City, 1976, p. 570. 
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COUNTER-ARGUMENT IV 
IF THIS APPEAL WERE MOOT, THERE NEVER WOULD OR EVER 
COULD BE A DECISION INTERPRETING §12, UAPA, OR ANY COROLLARY 
AGENCY RULE. 
The Division argues that this appeal is moot because, if 
the lower court were reversed and it were required to reinstate 
the extraordinary writ, the relief that would result is that 
which is in the very process of presently occurring, namely, 
agency review by the executive director of the Department of 
Commerce. The argument ignores the fact that had the Division or 
the Court of Appeals reviewed Appellants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
and the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order relative thereto, the 
proceedings may have not gone any further and required the 
enormous amount of time, energy and money spent by all the 
parties, including the taxpayers of Utah. To the extent the 
failure to address the ALJ's August 29, "order" was a mistake, 
Appellants have been severely damaged and a ruling reversing the 
ALJ would have dispensed with all that has occurred relentlessly 
between now and then, including Appellants' forthcoming appeal to 
this Court of the entire administrative adjudicative proceedings. 
Thus, a ruling from this Court on the merits is in the interests 
of judicial economy and will save this very Court from but 
another lengthy and far more protracted, complicated, and time 
consuming decision to render. A proper resolution of this appeal 
will thus obviate additional appeals to this very Court. 
-10-
Moreover, in the event Appellants do not get a favorable ruling 
from Executive Director Buhler and they seek judicial review 
under §16, UAPA, Appellants will more than likely move to 
consolidate this appeal with the forthcoming appeal of the entire 
administrative adjudicative proceedings. If such occurs, this 
Court can address all of the issues presented in both appeals and 
by virtue of this appeal, it will be able to see the entire 
picture of what has arbitrarily and capriciously transpired. 
If this appeal is moot, it also means that there would 
never be an appellate decision in Utah interpreting §12, UAPA. 
This is because under the practicalities of administrative and 
judicial appellate procedure, an administrative proceeding would 
clearly be resolved by the administrative agency prior to the 
time a judicial appeal is heard and ruled upon. Appellants 
submit that it was never the intention of the legislature or our 
legal system in general to render certain statutes unreviewable 
and uninterpretable by an appellate court as a matter of law. 
Yet this is precisely the Appellees' argument. Furthermore, if 
this appeal is indeed moot, why wasn't the very same issue on 
appeal in Aluminum Company moot for the same reasons, the very 
issue addressed first and foremost by then Judge Scalia? 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT V 
THE APPELLEES' OPPOSING BRIEF IS NON-RESPONSIVE TO 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND TOTALLY IGNORES THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
- 11 -
MERITS ISSUES OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION AND WHICH 
ARE NOW RIPE TO DECIDE. 
Without reiterating Appellants' Constitutional and other 
issues relative to the merits of their September 11, 1989, 
request for agency review, the Appellees have neglected to even 
refer in passing to such issues in their opposing brief. 
Furthermore, because the Appellees have lodged no objection to 
addressing the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order on the merits, they 
have certainly opened the door, if not encouraged, this Court to 
address such in their entirety. Further, to save the time and 
expense of a forthcoming appeal of the entire administrative 
adjudicative proceedings, this Court would be well advised in the 
interests of its own time and that of the parties to review the 
ALJ's Order on its merits in this appeal. 
There is also authority that an appellate court has 
authority to modify a judgment in a mandamus proceeding. Cain v. 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, 582 P.2d 
332, 335 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1978). Accordingly, this Court has the 
ability to rule on the merits of both Appellants' Constitutional 
arguments before the lower court and those in their request for 
agency review, all as set forth in their Brief, if only to 
prevent further costly and wholly unnecessary litigation between 
the parties, including further appeals. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT VI 
- 12-
THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE APPELLANTS' ENTIRE 
LIVELIHOODS ARE AND HAVE BEEN AT STAKE AND WHEN CITIZENS ARE 
INEXTRICATED INTO A MALICIOUS AND POINTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS THREATENING THEIR VERY SURVIVAL, THEY HAVE 
EVERY RIGHT TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES. 
Appellants have been in the securities brokerage 
business for over 15 years. They have had thousands and 
thousands of customers. As a result of the Division's pointless 
proceedings,3 designed merely to teach the world that, according 
3
 The point of the Division's administrative adjudicative 
proceedings is and has been no less spectacular than to create a 
legal precedent that one who simply buys unregistered, non-exempt 
securities (for whatever reason) is guilty of aiding and abetting 
the unlawful sale thereof. [Emphasis added.] This Division 
obsession is legally ridiculous in that it creates a strict 
liability, in pari delicto defense to the offer and sale of 
unregistered, non-exempt securities by professional stock 
swindlers or anyone else. In fact, what is so remarkable is that 
on June 15, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court already rejected, in 
this very context, the "substantial factor" test (one of the 
components of the three prong aiding and abetting test) in Pinter 
v. Dahl, [ ' 87-' 88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
193,790. 
Without being facetious, the other point made by the 
Division's proceedings is that "crime does pay." For instance, 
on September 7, 1990, U.S. District Judge David Sam, in the case 
of United States v. James Lynn Averett, Case No. 90-CR-129S, 
sentenced Utah attorney James L. Averett to mere probation for 
having pleaded guilty to the felony of criminal conspiracy 
relative to his direct involvement in the U.S.A. Medical stock 
fraud and market manipulation. By sharp comparison, it is 
undisputed that Appellants single-handedly exposed the entire 
U.S.A. Medical fraud and market manipulation in U.S. District 
Judge Greene's court at February end, 1989. As their reward for 
doing the government's work, Appellants have had a determination 
by Appellees that their registrations with the Division be 
revoked for a year, an additional two year probationary period, 
and, as a result, their entire business and reputations have been 
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to the Division, securities broker-dealers shouldn't honor 
conflicting and pre-existing federal, SEC and NASD obligations, 
Appellants' business and livelihoods have now been destroyed. To 
be sure, in simply complying with their overriding SEC and NASD 
obligations and responsibilities, Appellants are, thanks to the 
Division, out of business -- without even a just resolution of 
these proceedings. For instance, based on the pendency of these 
proceedings, Appellants have had to withdraw their NASD 
registrations and a valuable trader, who brought in nearly a 
million dollars a year in income, has left the firm. Appellant 
Johnson is now out of work after having operated a successful 
brokerage firm with, at one time, up to 20 employees. Several of 
such employees have also been put out of work and have had to 
seek other, less promising employment. There is thus nothing 
frivolous about the chaos and havoc the Division has raised in 
the lives of Appellants and those of their former employees just 
to make a point that never had to be made in the first place. 
Certainly there is nothing frivolous about doing what a person 
has to do to protect himself and his or her very existence, 
destroyed. Thus, the lesson learned from the Division is that it 
pays for a broker-dealer to participate directly in a securities 
fraud and market manipulation by directly and secretly buying 
stock from those directly involved in the scheme as opposed to 
doing what Appellants did, namely, what is known in the industry 
as "whistleblowing". To be sure, the Division's position is 
contrary to SEC v. Dirks, (U.S. Supreme Court) (July 1, 1983) 
['82-'83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 199,255, n. 8, 
p. 96,124. 
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including seeking to expedite the proper resolution of 
administrative adjudicative proceedings through extraordinary 
relief. The Appellees' flippant view of their power and ability 
to destroy peoples1 lives and reputations, as if they were 
spending their own money, not someone else's in the process, is 
certainly anything but frivolous. 
The irony of this case is that the Division licenses 
16,833 agents, 763 broker-dealers, and 91 investment advisors.4 
At the same time, the Division has admittedly done little more 
since April 27, 1989, than pursue Appellants with a vengeance,5 
simply for complying with their federal, SEC and NASD 
obligations. If the Appellants' defense to such pointless 
proceedings is itself frivolous, then perhaps no one should 
engage in the securities brokerage business, or any other 
4
 Source: The Commerce Quarterly published by the Utah 
Department of Commerce, August, 1990, an article ironically 
entitled, of all things, "Division Mission". 
5
 The Division's excuse as to why it hasn't prosecuted 
virtually anyone else in the last year and a half over anything 
is that it has been admittedly concentrating on putting 
Appellants herein out-of-business. For instance, the Division, 
in 1989, filed an action against registered agent Paul Jones, a 
securities broker who sold U.S.A. Medical-stock to Appellants in 
direct violation of the Division's March 1989, Orders. Yet 
instead of moving for summary judgment against Mr. Jones in the 
last year and a half -- a rather facile endeavor requiring a one 
page supporting memorandum -- the Division has busied itself, at 
the taxpayers' expense, pursuing Appellants for honoring their 
overriding federal obligations, -conduct on the part of Appellants 
that ironically did not result in the distribution of any 
U.S.A. Medical stock to any Utah residents -- the only avowed 
goal of the Division's March 1989, Orders, and which it is 
undisputed that Mr. Jones, not Appellants 
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business regulated by government, and everyone should just quit, 
go home, and watch cable television. To be sure, this state has 
a deplorable reputation for securities fraud.6 Yet, the Division 
sees fit to single-out these two Appellants as the only persons 
it regulates and seek an unlawful $50,000 "fine" for the last llA 
years -- not for engaging in securities fraud -- but for buying 
worthless stock which was not redistributed to Utah residents, 
stock used solely by Appellants to honor pre-existing Exchange 
Act contracts and insure that those to whom Appellants previously 
owed stock out of this state, would not lose several hundred 
thousand dollars. 
The Division's cry and hue of the frivolousness of this 
appeal brings to mind what is presently occurring in RICO 
litigation across this nation. In the well-known and cited RICO 
case of Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. v. Public Service 
Company of Indiana, Inc., 67 8 F.Supp. 757, 761 n.l 
6
 See e.cf. , The "Stock-Fraud" Capital Tries To Clean Up 
Its Act, Business Week, February 6, 1984, at 76. ("[Utah] is now 
known as the sewer of the securities industry. The SEC estimates 
that some 10,000 state residents lost up to $700 million through 
unregistered securities, fraud and flagrant mismanagement over 
the past three or four years."); Utah Investors Said to Lose $125 
Million In Securities Scam, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1984 at 
42. Regardless of Utah's reputation for securities fraud, it is 
significant that in the case at bar, not one single, solitary 
Utah resident was in the least damaged by the conduct of 
Appellants in complying with U.S. District Judge Greene's ruling 
and in otherwise acting with integrity and commercial honor to 
protect those out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations to whom they owed U.S.A. Medical stock prior to 
March 1, 1989. 
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(S.D. Ind. 1988), the Court stated: 
This Court's research reveals that it has 
become standard practice for RICO defendants 
to allege lack of specificity. This Court 
takes a dim view of this litigation strategy 
because it tends to delay, rather than 
enhance, a resolution of a RICO claim. For 
example, in this case, PSI filed an answer to 
WVPA's original complaint. When WVPA amended 
its complaint to add its RICO claim, WVPA 
incorporated its prior allegations into its 
RICO claim. Suddenly, however, the PSI were 
unable to answer because of lack of 
specificity. 
By the same token, it has become standard practice to allege 
frivolousness in appeals and everywhere else. The Division, 
which in this appeal chose not to file a motion for summary 
disposition, is using no different and no less pitiable of a 
tactic with respect to frivolousness. Such charges, as with 
those in Wabash, do not resolve the dispute in issue. Certainly, 
if Appellants are dragged through the another malicious 
administrative process as the Division has vindictively 
threatened, Appellants are entitled to a proper and just 
interpretation of §12, UAPA, and the corollary rule, inasmuch as 
none presently exists. For these reasons, this appeal is far 
from frivolous and this Court should take a similar "dim view" of 
such "standard practice". 
Lastly, if this appeal is frivolous, one has to explain 
away why the district court, after being well advised, granted 
Appellants' Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the first place on 
October 27, 1989. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 125 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
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23y 25 (Sup. Ct. 1990)(one of reasons appeal lacked merit was 
fact of losing on summary judgment so resoundingly in lower 
court). 
CONCLUSION 
This case, contrary to what Appellees assert, is about 
false pride, the false pride of a government agency that has no 
interest whatsoever in discovering if it is acting in error and 
which uses its own little forum to foist the personal agendas of 
its personnel on those it regulates, what this case is about is 
a government agency which brought an action against but two of 
its nearly 17,500 licensees because it "heard" -- through 
unreliable sources which included convicted securities felons --
that Appellants made several hundred thousand dollars "covering" 
their "short" positions in certain unregistered securities. Yet 
when the Division and its counsel eventually learned that 
Appellants hadn't made a "fortune" (i.e., that Appellants made 
just over $6,000 and had spent well over $100,000 in attorney's 
fees alone) and that Appellants wouldn't (or couldn't, even if 
they wanted to) pay the Division a $50,000 unlawful "fine" to 
settle the matter,7 it was too late to bow out gracefully and 
1
 When the proceedings were initially brought against 
Appellants in April 1989, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6 did not confer 
any power or authority on the Division to extract fines from its 
licensees. As a result of these proceedings and the Division's 
embarrassment at trying to extract a $50,000 fine from Appellants 
which they had no authority to do, the Division lobbied the 
legislature and such statute was amended, effective April 23, 
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dismiss the proceedings. Then, in a concerted effort to 
perpetuate such proceedings and "cover" its own embarrassment and 
indiscretion at not reasonably investigating in advance -- and 
also because Appellants had the "audacity" to resist the 
proceedings -- the Division embarked on a campaign to put 
Appellants, and no one else, out-of-business no matter what the 
cost to the taxpayer or anyone else. 
One would think that a government agency would want to 
know whether it had jurisdiction to regulate citizens in a manner 
diametrically inconsistent with its licensees' simultaneous 
obligations under federal law. However, instead of being the 
least bit interested in resolving this rather paramount, 
preliminary issue, the Division sought to "string" the 
proceedings out endlessly in its own little forum, hoping that 
Appellants would get tired of the cost and expense and eventually 
capitulate to a sanction, thereby justifying the Division's 
"noble" efforts to allegedly "protect the public" from, of all 
people, those like Appellants. 
At issue here is whether Appellants had the right to get 
the case disposed of summarily and quickly and whether the 
Division should want to know if it indeed had jurisdiction to 
requlate Appellants in a manner antithetical to federal rules and 
1990, to allow the director to impose a fine at his or her 
discretion. See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1), as amended, p. 5, 
top, of 19 90 Supplement. 
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regulations.8 Appellants believe that this issue should have 
been submitted to an impartial reviewing officer without delay or 
Appellants should have at least been permitted to pursue the 
issue quickly and effectively with the appropriate appellate 
court, either by way of extraordinary writ or otherwise. What 
this case is about is creating precedent that either an agency or 
the courts ought to review dispositive matters under §12, UAPA, 
or the corollary rule. 
Appellants have been told that administrative 
adjudicative proceedings were designed with the intent that 
disposition in such forums would be cheaper, more efficient, and 
certainly more cost-effective. Yet the administrative 
adjudicative proceedings in issue are a monument to the fact that 
this is anything but the case, that Appellants could have 
litigated the entire matter in district court or elsewhere at 
half the cost in time, energy, money and mutual animosity. This 
Court should rule that the Division should have heard the 
Appellants' dispositive request for agency review or certified 
the same for judicial appeal as Judge Sawaya originally ordered. 
At the same time, this Court should dismiss the administrative 
8 See this very Court's decision in Western Capital & 
Securities, Inc. v. Kundsvig, 799 P.2d 688, 113 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 53, (Ct. App., February 7, 1989), [1989 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 194,337. The Court should also 
note Rule 302 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: "In 
civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption 
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to 
which federal law supplies the rule of decision is determined in 
accordance with federal law." [Emphasis added.] 
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adjudicative proceedings in their entirety in that Appellees' 
amended petitions were pre-empted under federal securities law. 
Further, this Court should decide that the proceedings are and 
have been unconstitutional because Appellants have been pursued 
by those acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner --
all at the same time. These are sufficient grounds to dismiss 
the proceedings in their entirety and make any and all other 
rulings prayed for in Appellants' Brief. 
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